Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4262867
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00082zbMath0947.91052MaRDI QIDQ4262867
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
Related Items (16)
Large-Scale Bundle-Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis ⋮ Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining ⋮ Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information ⋮ Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents ⋮ Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly ⋮ Regulating risk-averse producers: the case of complementary products ⋮ Hamiltonian approach to multi-dimensional screening ⋮ Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets ⋮ Computing prices for target profits in contracts ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design ⋮ Price discrimination and majority voting
This page was built for publication: Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
