The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
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Publication:4262869
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00084zbMath0947.91059OpenAlexW2025183095MaRDI QIDQ4262869
Jean Tirole, Ian Jewitt, Mathias Dewatripont
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00084
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