Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
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Publication:4262877
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00091zbMath0948.91007OpenAlexW3122483313MaRDI QIDQ4262877
Larry Samuelson, Kenneth G. Binmore
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00091
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