Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
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Publication:4262966
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00096zbMath0946.91014MaRDI QIDQ4262966
Publication date: 28 May 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (13)
Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods ⋮ (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market ⋮ Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents ⋮ Second chance offers in auctions ⋮ The effectiveness of English auctions. ⋮ Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder ⋮ Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders ⋮ Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects ⋮ What format for multi-unit multiple-bid auctions? ⋮ Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
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