Contracting with Externalities
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Publication:4262977
DOI10.1162/003355399556016zbMath0953.91026OpenAlexW1491239794MaRDI QIDQ4262977
Publication date: 29 November 1999
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/90c168j1
Related Items (32)
Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ The timing of contracting with externalities ⋮ On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting ⋮ Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart ⋮ Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks ⋮ Self-managing terror: resolving agency problems with diverse teams ⋮ Optional fixed fees in multilateral vertical relations ⋮ Collective hold‐up ⋮ Pay equality among heterogeneous agents ⋮ Combinatorial agency ⋮ Screening while controlling an externality ⋮ On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations ⋮ Exploiting social influence in networks ⋮ Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? ⋮ Optimal Nonlinear Pricing in Social Networks Under Asymmetric Network Information ⋮ Manipulation in Games ⋮ Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure ⋮ Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information ⋮ Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences ⋮ Contracting with externalities and outside options ⋮ Group targeting under networked synergies ⋮ Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting ⋮ The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining ⋮ Optimal pricing policy design for selling cost-reducing innovation in Cournot games ⋮ Games played in a contracting environment ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities ⋮ Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing ⋮ Optimal contracting in networks ⋮ Sequential vote buying ⋮ On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information ⋮ Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
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