Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt

DOI10.1162/003355398555496zbMath0944.91030OpenAlexW2133640915MaRDI QIDQ4264321

Oliver D. Hart, John Hardman Moore

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555496

zbMATH Keywords

debtoptimal debt contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

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