Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

DOI10.1162/003355398555621zbMath0951.91035OpenAlexW2032761389WikidataQ29030637 ScholiaQ29030637MaRDI QIDQ4266359

Ben Lockwood, David de Meza

Publication date: 30 September 1999

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555621

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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