Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium

DOI10.2307/2938373zbMath0783.90018OpenAlexW2005059360MaRDI QIDQ4271329

Hugo Sonnenschein, Andrew McLennan

Publication date: 9 January 1994

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938373

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingexchange economyWalrasian equilibriumWalrasian allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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