scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584
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Publication:4273943
zbMath0781.90005MaRDI QIDQ4273943
Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Alvin E. Roth
Publication date: 8 December 1993
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Decision theory (91B06) Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)
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