The division problem with voluntary participation
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Publication:427509
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0530-9zbMath1239.91061OpenAlexW2150453449MaRDI QIDQ427509
Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Gustavo Bergantiños
Publication date: 13 June 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0530-9
Related Items (3)
The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints ⋮ Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences ⋮ The division problem under constraints
Cites Work
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