Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
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Publication:427512
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0535-4zbMath1239.91052OpenAlexW2147044680MaRDI QIDQ427512
Itai Ashlagi, Shigehiro Serizawa
Publication date: 13 June 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0535-4
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