On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
From MaRDI portal
Publication:427520
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0539-0zbMath1239.91049OpenAlexW2071211011MaRDI QIDQ427520
Publication date: 13 June 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0539-0
Related Items (1)
Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Circular domains
- Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Dictators on blocks: Generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems
- Dictatorial domains
- Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
- Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
This page was built for publication: On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
