Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation

DOI10.1007/S10058-012-0114-XzbMath1241.91025OpenAlexW2040809372MaRDI QIDQ427551

Berno Buechel, Tim Hellmann

Publication date: 13 June 2012

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://doc.rero.ch/record/305716/files/externalitiesred12publishedversion.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencyspilloversnetworksconnectionsexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (9)

Stability, efficiency, and contentedness of social storage networks ⋮ Group representation concerns and network formation ⋮ Relationship externalities ⋮ On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks ⋮ Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation ⋮ Competition for the access to and use of information in networks ⋮ Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game ⋮ Evolution of social networks ⋮ Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities

Cites Work

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• Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation
• Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation
• Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games
• Unequal connections
• Communication networks with endogenous link strength
• Stable networks
• The formation of networks with transfers among players
• Network potentials
• Structural holes in social networks
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation

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