Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
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Publication:427552
DOI10.1007/S10058-011-0112-4zbMath1239.91071OpenAlexW2089326555MaRDI QIDQ427552
Publication date: 13 June 2012
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-011-0112-4
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Cites Work
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