Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
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Publication:4286285
DOI10.2307/2951643zbMath0791.90018OpenAlexW2157518489MaRDI QIDQ4286285
Publication date: 27 March 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951643
asymmetric informationauctionscompetitive equilibriummechanism designprice formationmany buyersmany sellers
Economic growth models (91B62) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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