Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
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Publication:4286286
DOI10.2307/2951644zbMath0866.90145OpenAlexW1973767645MaRDI QIDQ4286286
Michael Manove, Ching-to Albert Ma
Publication date: 27 April 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f597e8269a51198f0d1bd68cb8b81c85e3bde929
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