Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints

DOI10.2307/2951649zbMath0798.90149OpenAlexW2043022479MaRDI QIDQ4286292

Robert J. Gary-Bobo, Bernard Bensaid

Publication date: 1 November 1994

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951649

zbMATH Keywords

renegotiationthreatthird partyoutside agentpre-play control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Unobservable contracts as precommitments ⋮ Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information ⋮ Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

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