Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4290971
DOI10.2307/2951613zbMath0799.90042OpenAlexW2170478564MaRDI QIDQ4290971
Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Rey, Philippe Aghion
Publication date: 17 November 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1905/1/renegotiation_design.pdf
incomplete contractsinvestmentrisk-sharingcontract renegotiationunverifiable informationbuyer-seller relationshipRubinstein bargaining games
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (21)
Intrinsic impediments to category captainship collaboration ⋮ The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems ⋮ Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain ⋮ Credible implementation ⋮ KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION ⋮ Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market ⋮ Holdup, search, and inefficiency ⋮ Search equilibrium with unobservable investment ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship ⋮ Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness ⋮ On efficient firm formation ⋮ Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information ⋮ Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements ⋮ After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment ⋮ The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup ⋮ Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) ⋮ Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem ⋮ Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts ⋮ On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems ⋮ The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
This page was built for publication: Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
