Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another
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Publication:429143
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.003zbMath1241.91073OpenAlexW2018658089MaRDI QIDQ429143
Sandro Shelegia, Yossef Spiegel
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.003
Related Items (7)
Overlapping ownership, endogenous quality, and welfare ⋮ Partial cross ownership, exclusive contracting, and market entry ⋮ Vertical differentiation with overlapping ownership ⋮ Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination ⋮ Effects of partial passive ownership in a successive endogenous timing game with R&D spillovers ⋮ Passive cross-holding in a Stackelberg oligopoly ⋮ Product positioning with overlapping ownership
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