Value of public information in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.10.007zbMath1241.91023OpenAlexW3122334123MaRDI QIDQ429165

J. Herrera, H. S. Yoon

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

value of informationcheap talksenderreceiver games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

Persuasion and receiver's news ⋮ Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources ⋮ Experimental design to persuade ⋮ Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

Cites Work

• Informal communication
• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Information transmission when the informed party is confused
• Allocation of Decision-making Authority
• Strategic Information Transmission

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