The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After

DOI10.2307/2951658zbMath0798.90023OpenAlexW1975340078MaRDI QIDQ4301027

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publication date: 12 July 1994

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16203/1/Laffont_16203.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agentoptimal contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Competitive contracts with productive information gathering ⋮ On the relative performance of alternative regulatory instruments for constraining a firm's profitability ⋮ Stochastic Programming Perspective on the Agency Problems Under Uncertainty ⋮ Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ R&D IN CLEANER TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE ⋮ A comparison of milestone contract and royalty contract under critical value criterion in R\&D alliance

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