Reputation and influence in charitable giving: an experiment
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Publication:430145
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9245-8zbMath1243.91024OpenAlexW2037606525WikidataQ57924148 ScholiaQ57924148MaRDI QIDQ430145
David Reinstein, Gerhard Riener
Publication date: 20 June 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/2934/1/dp688.pdf
Related Items (2)
Creating a domain of losses in the laboratory: effects of endowment size ⋮ On the spread of charitable behavior in a social network: a model based on game theory
Cites Work
- Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?
- Does context matter more for hypothetical than for actual contributions? evidence from a natural field experiment
- Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
- Altruism in anonymous dictator games
- Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem
- Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
- Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice1
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
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