Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games?

DOI10.1007/S11238-011-9247-6zbMath1243.91023OpenAlexW2056551063MaRDI QIDQ430149

Ulrich Kamecke, Lisa V. Bruttel

Publication date: 20 June 2012

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9247-6

zbMATH Keywords

experimentinfinite horizonprisoner's dilemmacontinuation rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Instrumental reciprocity as an error ⋮ The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment ⋮ Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end ⋮ The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: an experiment
• The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players

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