Entry Deterrence in the Commons

DOI10.2307/2527067zbMath0802.90034OpenAlexW2041080650MaRDI QIDQ4301667

Stephen Polasky, Charles F. Mason

Publication date: 14 August 1994

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ded9f1acb84306fc74f827719a68706c99377878

zbMATH Keywords

common property resource modelpotential entry of a rival

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

A note on oligopoly exploitation of common-pool renewable resources ⋮ Asymmetric information may protect the commons: the welfare benefits of uninformed regulators ⋮ MONOPOLY, POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND PRIVATE STOCK INFORMATION IN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE MARKETS ⋮ Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey ⋮ EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES ⋮ Cooperation in the commons ⋮ When additional resource stocks reduce welfare

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