The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium
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Publication:4302546
DOI10.2307/2951732zbMath0820.90131OpenAlexW1969243841MaRDI QIDQ4302546
William R. Zame, Lawrence E. Blume
Publication date: 14 September 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/dffa971f61a74202b3b30df905cefed29a95d201
extensive form gamessemi-algebraic setssequential equilibriumperfect equilibriumperfect recallTarski-Seidenberg theorem
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