Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy

DOI10.2307/2297902zbMath0809.90091OpenAlexW1974780571MaRDI QIDQ4306280

Yingyi Qian

Publication date: 28 March 1995

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/35129e808137c85743a5835d81173fda43982843

zbMATH Keywords

incentiveshierarchy modelloss of control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Application models in control theory (93C95) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Social choice (91B14) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

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