Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study

DOI10.2307/2297903zbMath0809.90142OpenAlexW1970460225MaRDI QIDQ4306281

Howard Rosenthal, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 24 October 1994

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80966/

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationdiscounted repeated playone-shot Bayesian Nash equilibriumpublic good environment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction ⋮ Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism ⋮ Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play ⋮ Bayesian repeated games and reputation ⋮ Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: an experiment ⋮ An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games ⋮ At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency ⋮ The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont

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