Choosing a gambling partner: testing a model of mutual insurance in the lab
From MaRDI portal
Publication:430908
DOI10.1007/S11238-011-9267-2zbMath1242.91091OpenAlexW2004632071MaRDI QIDQ430908
Marco Spallone, Emanuela Sciubba, Daniela Di Cagno
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9267-2
Related Items (2)
Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty ⋮ Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk
Cites Work
- Informal insurance in social networks
- Public goods in networks
- Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
- Are groups more (or less) consistent than individuals?
- Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?
- Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance
- Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
- An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation
This page was built for publication: Choosing a gambling partner: testing a model of mutual insurance in the lab
