Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum

DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9286-zzbMath1241.91042OpenAlexW2040565240MaRDI QIDQ430916

Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu, Lainé, Jean

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9286-z

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingPareto efficiencyreferendumapproval ballotingmultiple elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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