Incentive strategies dealing with uncertainty about the follower's MCDM behaviour

DOI10.1080/00207729408949288zbMath0808.90149OpenAlexW2007711507MaRDI QIDQ4311235

Kyoichi Kijima, Chunhui Xu

Publication date: 26 October 1994

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207729408949288

zbMATH Keywords

multiple criteria decision-makingtwo-person Stackelberg gamememory strategyminimum- deviation incentive strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

On misrepresentation-proof strategies in incentive design problems

Cites Work

• On incentive problems
• A control-theoretic view on incentives
• Performance bounds for hierarchical systems under partial dynamic information
• Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability

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