Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
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Publication:431213
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0566-6zbMath1252.91051OpenAlexW2236131901MaRDI QIDQ431213
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0566-6
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