Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0566-6zbMath1252.91051OpenAlexW2236131901MaRDI QIDQ431213

Itai Sher

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0566-6

zbMATH Keywords

collusionwinner determination problemVCG mechanismcombinatorial auctionsshill bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting

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