The structure of unstable power mechanisms
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Publication:431215
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0568-4zbMath1251.91016OpenAlexW2155742530MaRDI QIDQ431215
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0568-4
Nash equilibriumacyclicitystability indexSolvabilitycollusionNakamura numbereffectivity functioninteraction formStrong equilibrium
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Group preferences (91B10) Individual preferences (91B08)
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Cites Work
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