A one-shot proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0693-3zbMath1245.91030OpenAlexW2048987283WikidataQ56114309 ScholiaQ56114309MaRDI QIDQ431217

Ning Neil Yu

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0693-3

zbMATH Keywords

dictatorshipArrow's impossibility theoremsocial welfare function\((i, j)\)-pivotal voter

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (11)

Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship ⋮ Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ A complete characterization of hierarchy ⋮ Rawls's maximin rule and Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem ⋮ Arrow's decisive coalitions ⋮ Counting condorcet ⋮ Generalized Rawlsianism ⋮ The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice

Cites Work

• Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Unnamed Item

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