Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0571-9zbMath1244.90082OpenAlexW2120908243MaRDI QIDQ431223

Jie-Ping Mo, Been-Lon Chen, Ping Wang

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0571-9

zbMATH Keywords

technical progressstable assignmentmicro-matchingturnover

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production models (90B30) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Price discrimination and efficient matching
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• Random matching in the college admissions problem
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Technology Cycle and Inequality
• On the core of linear production games
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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