The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
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Publication:431227
DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0569-3zbMath1246.91033OpenAlexW1966973439MaRDI QIDQ431227
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0569-3
Related Items (11)
Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ An alternative characterization of top trading cycles ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities ⋮ An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Two simple variations of top trading cycles ⋮ Minimal envy and popular matchings ⋮ Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects ⋮ Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems ⋮ A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
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