A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0524-ZzbMath1244.91037OpenAlexW2078726278MaRDI QIDQ431805

Chun-Hsien Yeh, Yan-An Hwang

Publication date: 3 July 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0524-z

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuenucleolusairport problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives

Cites Work

• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems
• Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations
• The separability principle in bargaining
• A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
• Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games
• Associated consistency and equal allocation of nonseparable costs
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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