Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0529-7zbMath1243.91034OpenAlexW2074430967MaRDI QIDQ431806

Maria Gabriella Graziano, Maria Romaniello

Publication date: 3 July 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0529-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (7)

The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour ⋮ Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods ⋮ Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods ⋮ Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ Inexact proximal point methods for multiobjective quasiconvex minimization on Hadamard manifolds ⋮ A proximal point-type method for multicriteria optimization ⋮ OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS

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