A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0532-7zbMath1243.91048OpenAlexW2035383755MaRDI QIDQ431813

Matt Van Essen

Publication date: 3 July 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0532-7

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitypublic goodsmechanism designsupermodular gamesLindahl equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (2)

A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation ⋮ Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms

Cites Work

• Adaptive expectations and dynamic adjustment in noncooperative games with incomplete information
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

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