Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent

DOI10.2307/2526999zbMath0812.90023OpenAlexW2033636266MaRDI QIDQ4320058

Paul Beaudry

Publication date: 15 January 1995

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526999

zbMATH Keywords

incentive contractsprincipal-agent relationshipinformed-principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case ⋮ Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics ⋮ The strategically ignorant principal

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