Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game
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Publication:4320062
DOI10.2307/2527003zbMath0812.90035OpenAlexW2065091890MaRDI QIDQ4320062
Anjan V. Thakor, Arnoud W. A. Boot
Publication date: 15 January 1995
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527003
risk neutralitycompetitive credit marketfirst-best action choicesrepeated moral hazard with discounting
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mathematical economics (91B99) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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