A dynamic game of coalition formation under ambiguity

DOI10.1007/s00500-010-0573-3zbMath1245.91012OpenAlexW1985426140MaRDI QIDQ432178

Giuseppe De Marco, Maria Romaniello

Publication date: 3 July 2012

Published in: Soft Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-010-0573-3

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitycoalition formationbest reply dynamicscoherent beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (2)

Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences ⋮ A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Dynamic economic theory. A viability approach
• Ambiguous games
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Extending Lee–Carter Mortality Forecasting
• Set-valued analysis
• Viability theory

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