How to convince someone that you can be trusted? The role of ‘hostages’

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2001.9990260zbMath0996.91087OpenAlexW2047386728MaRDI QIDQ4329468

Vincent Buskens, Chris Snijders

Publication date: 6 November 2002

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2001.9990260

zbMATH Keywords

trustgame theorysignalingriskcommitmentshostages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (1)

Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability

Cites Work

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• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test

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