Inductivism and Parmenidean epistemology: Kyburg's way

DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2010.11.002zbMath1252.03014OpenAlexW2007217220MaRDI QIDQ432961

Isaac Levi

Publication date: 5 July 2012

Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2010.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

acceptance as evidenceinductive acceptanceinductive rejectionParmenidean epistemologyserious possibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Related Items (1)

Making decisions with evidential probability and objective Bayesian calibration inductive logics

Cites Work

• Conditional probability and defeasible inference
• The logical foundations of statistical inference
• Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief
• Uncertain Inference
• The Logic of Risky Knowledge

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