Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.12.018zbMath1242.91009OpenAlexW2124391521MaRDI QIDQ433146

Matthias Dahm, Luis C. Corchon

Publication date: 13 July 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.192.4063

zbMATH Keywords

contest success functionendogenous contestsmixed-strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (4)

Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses ⋮ Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach ⋮ Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests

Cites Work

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• Contest success functions
• Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
• Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization
• Foundations for contest success functions
• The Demand Theory of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
• The Probability Weighting Function
• Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves

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