Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.12.011zbMath1242.91077OpenAlexW3126007269WikidataQ57388179 ScholiaQ57388179MaRDI QIDQ433153

Carolina Manzano, Xavier Vives

Publication date: 13 July 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/151544

zbMATH Keywords

hedgingasymmetric informationinformation acquisitionrational expectations equilibriumrisk exposuresupply information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Related Items (17)

Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare ⋮ The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Comments on: ``Government intervention through informed trading in financial markets ⋮ Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ Financial prices and information acquisition in large Cournot markets ⋮ Reprint of: ``Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ On the relation between private information and non-fundamental volatility ⋮ Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology ⋮ Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations ⋮ Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals ⋮ Rational destabilization in a frictionless market ⋮ Searching for information ⋮ Snowballing private information ⋮ Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure ⋮ An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• Introduction to the stability of rational expectations equilibrium
• Financial market innovation and security design: An introduction
• Learning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks
• On “Acquisition of Information in Financial Markets”
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset Securities Markets
• Regulating Insider Trading When Investment Matters *
• Information Acquisition in Financial Markets
• How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
• Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices

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