Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
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Publication:433155
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.012zbMath1242.91056OpenAlexW2142687993MaRDI QIDQ433155
Publication date: 13 July 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/360.pdf
Related Items (5)
Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting ⋮ The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ Strategic stability in Poisson games ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
Cites Work
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Large Poisson games
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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