Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.012zbMath1242.91125OpenAlexW2036557636MaRDI QIDQ433169

Cemil Selcuk

Publication date: 13 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36224/1/MPRA_paper_36224.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversiondirected searchcompeting mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (4)

Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Bidding for incentive contracts ⋮ Buyer's equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility: a recursive approach ⋮ Directed Search with Endogenous Capacity

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• Equivalence of auctions and posted prices
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.

This page was built for publication: Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse