Toward Natural Implementation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4331914
DOI10.2307/2527318zbMath0867.90008OpenAlexW1980928328MaRDI QIDQ4331914
Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, Takehiko Yamato, Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Publication date: 13 February 1997
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527318
social choice correspondencesexchange economiesprice-quantity mechanismnatural mechanismno-envy correspondence
Related Items
Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem ⋮ Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills ⋮ Divide-and-permute ⋮ Procedurally fair implementation under complete information ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ The optimal design of a market ⋮ Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget ⋮ Are incentives against economic justice? ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally ⋮ Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments ⋮ Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results ⋮ Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Implementation in production economies with increasing returns ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms ⋮ Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale ⋮ Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations ⋮ Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? ⋮ Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set ⋮ Natural implementation in public goods economies ⋮ Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations ⋮ Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury ⋮ Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions ⋮ Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences ⋮ A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution ⋮ Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium ⋮ Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions. ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
