The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2012.02.006zbMath1243.91079OpenAlexW2026147037MaRDI QIDQ433684

Ufuk Devrim Demirel

Publication date: 6 July 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

optimal fiscal and monetary policyquasi-commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (1)

Quantum Barro-Gordon game in monetary economics

Cites Work

• Optimal taxation in an RBC model: A linear-quadratic approach
• Fiscal policy under loose commitment

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