A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
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Publication:433728
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.11.043zbMath1242.91086OpenAlexW2004168648MaRDI QIDQ433728
Publication date: 6 July 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.043
Related Items (11)
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case ⋮ Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments ⋮ Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space ⋮ Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints ⋮ Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities ⋮ The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
Cites Work
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- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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